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Abstract
Governments have been advocating for an open
approach to encourage private sector disclosing
relevant information in order to create more efficient
market. However, it is not always clear what
information are needed by consumers. Policy makers
need to develop measures that help decide what
information should be disclosed and whether a
disclosure should be mandated. In this research, we
focus on information disclosure in organic products,
where consumers find the complex organic labeling
hard to understand. Through two studies, we show that
feed origin makes a significant difference in
consumers’ choice; and sellers with feed from nonUSA countries would be motivated to disguise the
information on feed origin. We propose a way to
implement “smart” information disclosure that can
effectively distinguish USA feed from feed with
undisclosed origin, which enables the feed from USA to
claim a higher price premium. Our findings have
policy implications for organic product disclosure.

1. Introduction
An efficient market calls for a free flow of
information between sellers and buyers. If properly
designed, information disclosure should promote
autonomy and quality of individual decision making,
increase efficiency and help prevent market failure
resulting from incomplete and asymmetric information
coupled with misaligned incentives [1-3]. However,
inappropriate information disclosure fails to improve
the quality of consumer decisions [1, 4, 5]. When
directly asked, consumers say they want to know
virtually everything about their choices [4]. In reality,
one of the most ubiquitous problems is the information
overload effect. Consumers are constantly confronted
with complex instructions and fine prints, yet they have
limited capacity to attend the information presented.
Too much disclosure can be counterproductive when it
distracts from more important information [1]. On the
other hand, not disclosing the relevant information
would introduce bias to people’s decision making.
Moreover, people tend to pay even less attention to the
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absence of information than to its presence, even when
both are equally informative [6].
Policymakers need to choose the most important
and relevant information, and provide guidance for
information to be disclosed in simple and easy to digest
form. It is not an easy task to decide what information
should be disclosed and how the information should be
presented to consumers. We focus on organic food
industry because of the information asymmetry
between sellers and buyers for this product category
[7]. It is very hard, if not impossible, for consumers to
detect the organic characteristics and quality even after
purchase and use of the product [8]. Consumers
typically rely on information cues such as organic
certification and labels to make a judgement on the
quality, while the organic certification process is
criticized for lacking rigor and adequate transparency
[9].
The market of organic food has expanded
drastically and the US domestic organic production is
not keeping up with the demand. According to the
Organic Trade Association, sales of organic food and
non-food products reach another record in 2014,
totaling $39.1 billion [10]. Domestic organic food
production has expanded 240 percent between 2002
and 2011, compared with 3 percent for non-organic
food production [11]. The growing demand for
organics, coupled with the near-total reliance by U.S.
farmers on genetically modified corn and soybeans, is
driving a surge in imports from other nations where
crops largely are free of bioengineering 1. Take organic
eggs as an example, America's farmers are not growing
enough organic corn and soybeans to feed the country's
organic animals. In 2014, the U.S. gets more than half
of its organic soybeans from abroad. The biggest
suppliers are China and India2.
1

“U.S. Forced to Import Corn as Shoppers Demand Organic Food,”

<http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-04-15/romaniancorn-imports-to-u-s-surge-as-shoppers-demand-organic>
2 “Chickens That Lay Organic Eggs Eat Imported Food, And It's
Pricey,”
<http://www.npr.org/sections/thesalt/2014/02/26/283112526/chicken
s-laying-organic-eggs-eat-imported-food-and-its-pricey>
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In organic food category, country of feed origin is a
manifestation of the information asymmetry between
sellers and buyers. Although USDA’s Food Safety and
Inspection Service (FSIS) requires country of origin
being disclosed on the labeling of most food products,
no regulation is found to mandate the disclosure of the
feed origin3. In another word, if an egg is laid in the
US, the country of origin of the egg is USA. However,
if the hen that laid the egg ate imported organic feed,
while the sellers are aware of the feed origin of their
product and the potential problems with certification
process of organic food in certain countries, they may
not be motivated to disclosure feed origin. Whether
country of feed origin is an important purchase
criterion for consumers should be of interest to policy
makers, because this may serve as the basis for
deciding whether feed origin should be a mandatory
disclosure. This question could also be of interest to
suppliers in that they are more informed of whether
labeling feed origin on their products could enable
them to charge price premium. This would especially
be of interest to third party platforms, because it helps
them design the system that match the needs of
consumers.
In this research, we investigate the following three
research questions. 1) Is the disclosure of country of
feed origin necessary for consumers in the market for
organic food? 2) Can a price premium be claimed on
organic food from countries with a more stringent legal
framework? 3) What are the effects on consumer
choices and price premium if the disclosure of feed
origin is mandated, or made a salient attributes through
“smart” disclosure?
We conducted two studies using online subjects.
Organic egg is chosen as the focal category. Through a
conjoint study and using a Hierarchical Bayes choice
model, we find that information on feed origin is an
important factor in people’s purchase decision of eggs,
more so than USDA organic certification label. This
study proposes an approach that can help policy
makers and private sectors decide what information
firms should disclose, and assess the impact on
marketing implication of the policy. The findings have
implications for smart disclosure policy which aims to
present information in an accessible way, in order to
empower consumer decision. This article contributes to
the burgeoning literature on the information regulation
and marketing of sustainable products. To authors’
knowledge, we are the first to explore the importance
and disclosure of country of feed origin for organic
food products, which has important implications for

policy makers, marketers and information sharing
platforms.

3http://www.fsis.usda.gov/shared/PDF/Labeling_Requiremen

4

ts_Guide.pdf

2.

Literature

review

In this section, we review the literature on the public
policy and consumer motivation of organic products.
On the regulatory aspect, we focus on the policy
environment for organic food, highlighting the
standards that govern organic production and quality
control. On the demand side, we discuss consumer
motivation to purchase organic food, the information
gap between sellers and buyers of organic products,
and the reliance of information cues for consumers to
judge the quality of organic products.

2.1 Organic Food Policy
Before the establishment of a federal policy framework
for organic food, a patchwork of industry standards and
state organic food laws had emerged since 1973 to
govern the U.S. organic food industry [12].
Responding to the call from organic farmers,
certification agents and organic trade association, a
national Organic Food Production Act of 1990 (OFPA)
was enacted by Congress to harmonize the divergent
standards. OFPA delegate the task of regulating
organic production, handling and labeling to the U.S.
Department
of
Agriculture
(USDA),
which
promulgated National Organic Program in 2002 as
binding rules to enforce OFPA. The purpose of these
federal regulations is to establish and implement
standards to govern the organic food industry and
ensure consumers that agriculture product marketed
with the organic label met uniform and consistent
standards [9].
NOP made specific requirements for organic
crop production, livestock farming, and the handling of
organic products4. To qualify as organic egg, the
poultry need to be fed organic feed. Organic feed are
produced on farms that practice organic farming,
which requires that crops must be produced on land
that are free of synthetic pesticide, herbicides and
fertilizer for three years before harvest and sufficient
buffer zone exists to reduce contamination from
surrounding lands [13]. The USDA certifies organic
products according to these guidelines. The way by
which the standards are ensured is through a
certification process. USDA however does not conduct
field inspections. Instead, it accredits certification
agents to review and certify organic farms and
processor in accordance to the standard set up in the
OFPA [9]. Currently, around 80 agents received
USDA’s authorization to certify farms and businesses.
7 CFR Part 205, Subpart C - Organic Production and
Handling Requirements
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Among them, many USDA-accredited certifying
agents are outside of US and most are allowed to
certify farms and businesses around the world [14].
This certification system is not free from
problems. One of the major issue is that certifying
agents are private entities that on the one hand have a
vested interests to maintain their creditability by
enforcing OFPA standards, and on the other hand are
paid by the applicants and need to compete for the
market to ensure the viability. An operation that may
has non-compliance issues may shop around for a more
lenient agent instead of addressing the risks and
problems, which essentially lower the rigor of the
organic standards. More importantly, the NOP
regulations ignored the original intent of the OPFA that
requires periodic residue testing by certifying agents.
Instead, the NOP regulations do not mandate residue
testing and deferred the decision to state officials and
certifying agents on whether to perform such testing.
Further, the state officials and certifying agents must
bear the costs of the tests. For a market where an
applicant can freely choose certifying agents and the
agents have little incentives to perform the necessary
testing for fear of losing business, the NOP regulation
have effectively eliminated the residue testing
requirements [9]. Another critique of the current
certification system is that the NOP have not been
effective in regulating foreign certifying agents.

2.2. Information
Disclosure Policy

Asymmetry

and

Smart

Consumers are generally not satisfied with the
availability of information that can guide their
purchase decision [15], and arguably, they are
especially in a disadvantaged position to judge the
potential compromises that the organic certification
system creates. Information asymmetry, the gap of
information with regard to the quality of organic
products between consumers and producers, are
expressly severe because of the nature of the products.
In making choices for products, consumer typically
relies on the dominant quality attributes, namely
search, experience, credence and potemkin attributes
[16]. A search attribute, such as freshness or
appearance, is known before the purchase and
consumers have the ability to examine it. Experience
attributes, such as taste, are known after the
consumption of the product. Credence attributes, such
as nutrition or contamination, are difficult to be
observed by consumers, but they can rely on third
parties for quality assurance. However, as noted
earlier, organic food can reach the market without any
residue testing, which is a failure to ensure the
credence attributes. Potemkin attributes are processrelated qualities that cannot be proved and controlled

through laboratory analyses by either the consumers or
external institutions. Only close monitoring of the
internal production process would have a chance to
detect fraud and mislabeling [16]. Organic claim with
the primary goal to “optimize the health and
productivity of interdependent communities of soil life,
plants, animals and people” [17] are essentially
potemkin attributes that are especially susceptible to
the lack of quality information on the side of
consumers. The NOP is process oriented regulation,
and the organic certification system is designed to
closely monitor the production process. However,
weaknesses of the NOP regulation give rise to
conditions for fraud and opportunistic behaviors in
such markets. This is especially troublesome for
organics imported from some developing countries
bearing “USDA Organic” seals, where the legal
framework is weak and corruptions are rampant [9].
Smart disclosure is a policy initiative
promoted by the US government to use information
disclosure as a regulatory approach to create more
transparent, efficient market for goods and services
(Executive Office of the President National Science
and Technology Council, 2013). The basic premise of
smart disclosure is giving more power to the general
public by transferring control of personal data from the
hands of corporate interests to the public [18, 19].
Recently, smart disclosure policy has been applied in
various sectors such as education, energy and
environment, health care, finance, food and nutrition,
safety, telecommunication, transportation and others.
Proponents of smart disclosure argue that such policy
can also be used to help consumers in making informed
decisions by minimizing behavioral biases resulting
from information overload and aversion to complexity
that consequently cause consumers to make
undesirable choices [20]. There is, however, a need for
public and private sector to connect information
disclosed with consumers’ motivations in order to be
effective in empowering consumer decision making.

2.3. Consumer Motivation and Demands for
Information
Consumers buy organic versus conventional products
for several reasons. Prior research have shown that
they are motivated by the perceived health and
nutrition benefits of organic products, environmental
concerns, and ethical considerations of animal welfare
[21]. Organic food is generally regarded as more
nutritious and safer than convention products [22].
Recent expansion of organic food market has also been
seen as the results of heightened awareness of the
impact of food systems on environment [23]. Such
consumers are willing to pay a price premium for the
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additional benefits consuming the organic products
[24].
However, these values are not attributes that
can be directly observed by consumers. Instead, they
rely on various information cues on the label when
evaluating products under uncertainty. Labels or
organic claims are widely used to transmit important
quality information to consumers [25]. Organic
labeling has been observed to be associated with a
higher level of perceived healthfulness, hedonism,
environmental friendliness and food safety [26, 27].
Since organic eggs are credence and potemkin
products, labels bearing organic certification elicit
certain level of confidence of the values acquired
through consuming organic egg.
Not all organic labels, however, elicit the
same level of trust. In general, a third-party
certification schedule is considered to be more
trustworthy than producers’ or retailers’ private
labelling scheme [28, 29]. Label agency makes a
difference to consumers’ perception and willingness to
pay. For example, in Switzerland, organic consumers
were willing to pay a higher premiums for products
with the Bio Suisses label, a label backed by the
farmers’ umbrella organization, compared to products
with other organic label [30]. Consumers in Denmark
and Czech Reblic are willing to pay the highest price
premium for governmental logo [31]. The reputation
and brand image of the label agency lend creditability
to the label, and enhance the level of consumer trust.
Although consumers are not willing to automatically
assume fidelity of quality assurance behind of every
label, they may place greater level of trust over the
logos backed by ethical practices and stringent legal
requirements [20]. In the US, USDA organic has been
an established logo with high level of consumer
awareness and positive perception of the certification
scheme behind it, consumers are responding to USDA
organic milk more positively then generic organic
labels [32]. In addition, animal welfare are cited as a
major concern for consumers purchasing organic, and
flock size is often listed by organic egg producers and
organic product information sharing organizations
(e.g., The Cornucopia Institute) as an indicator for
animal welfare.
The extant literature has not systematically
examined the information cues other than organic
labels that consumers would rely on to assess the
quality of organic products. The marketing literature
has documented country of origin as one of the
extrinsic information cues to help consumers detect the
quality of products. However, there is a lack of
empirical evidence in the literature on whether
consumer reacts to the information on organic
products’ feed origin. Given the weakness of organic

certification process and accountability in certain
countries, and yet no regulation to mandate the
disclosure of the feed origin, policy makers may want
to know if it is a potentially important decision making
factor in purchasing organic food for consumers and if
its disclosure should be made mandatory. Similarly,
certain organic sellers may benefit from disclosing the
feed origin, if it is indeed valued by consumers and the
sellers can charge a price premium labeling feed from
the US.

3. Empirical Study
3.1. Study 1
Study Design. The purpose of Study 1 is to address the
first two research questions. A conjoint approach was
used to elicit consumer preferences. Conjoint analysis
has been applied in marketing field as a major set of
techniques for measuring buyers’ tradeoffs among
multiattributed products and services [33]. It presents
consumers with various combinations of product
attributes and statistically estimates the effects of those
attributes on choice. Conjoint analysis has been widely
used in new product design and marketing mix
decisions.
We collected data using a Qualtrics webbased survey and a nationwide sample recruited from
an online panel. A total of 130 respondents participated
in this study. The respondents were screened to be US
citizens or permanent residents and they must be over
18 years old. Most of the participants have purchased
organic food (95.3%) and majority have bought
organic eggs (66.7%). On the introduction screen, we
informed participants that the purpose of our study was
to understand how consumers purchase eggs. They
then went through 16 choice-based conjoint tasks. The
attributes and levels used in the conjoint exercises are
shown in Table 1. Scholars have looked into consumer
preference on organic eggs in terms of price, organic
label, USDA label and cage-free [32]. In our conjoint
design, we included feed origin, our focal point of
interest, together with attributes from the literature.
The attribute levels were designed to be consistent with
the market situation. In market place, organic and nonorganic eggs have different price points. In our study,
organic eggs are priced at $4.99, $3.99 or $2.99 and
non-organic eggs are priced at $3.99, $2.99 or $1.99.
USDA is only associated with organic eggs and they
are typically sold at a premium in the market place. In
the study, USDA organic eggs are priced at $4.99 or
$3.99. Feed origin has a level “Not disclosed”. In study
1, we left this attribute level empty in the choice
exercises. This design is consistent with the market
place situation, where the feed origin is typically not
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disclosed on the package. Table 2 shows an example of
a conjoint choice set. Respondents were told to choose
the eggs they prefer the most assuming all the options
are dozen eggs and are identical on other attributes.
They were also given the option of not choosing.
Table 1: Conjoint Design, Attributes and Levels
Attributes Levels
Price per
dozen
Organic
feed

$1.99

$2.99

Organic
feed

Cage-free
USDA

Cagefree
USDA

Nonorganic
feed
In cages

Flock size

<10000

Feed origin

USA

NonUSDA
10,000100,000
China

$3.99

$4.99

The error term is assumed to follow the extreme value
(0,1) distribution, and as a result the probability that
consumer i chooses alternative j in choice set s follows
the multinomial logit model:
100,000250,000
Argentina

Not
disclosed
Not
disclosed

Table 2: An Example of the Conjoint Exercise
Egg A
Price:
$3.99/dozen
Organic feed
Hens are raised in
cages
No USDA
Organic
certification
Size: 10,000100,000 birds

Egg B
Price:
$4.99/dozen
Organic feed
Hens are raised
cage free
USDA Organic
certification
Size: 100,000250,000 birds
Feed comes
from Argentina

Egg C
Price:
$2.99/dozen
Non organic feed
Hens are raised
cage free
No USDA
Organic
certification
Feed comes from
USA

Model and Results.
We use hierarchical Bayes logit model to analyze the
conjoint data. Consumer i’s utility from choosing
option j can be written as:
uij   i , 0   i ,OriginNDOriginND   i ,OriginCOriginC   i ,OriginAOriginA
  i ,logprice Price   i ,OrganicOrganic   i ,CageFreeCageFree

(1)

Organic
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if feed is organic feed and 0 if otherwise;
CageFree
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if eggs are cage-free 0 if otherwise;
USDA
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if eggs are USDA organic and 0 if otherwise;
SizeND
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if hens are raised in houses with bird size not
disclosed and 0 if otherwise;
SizeSm
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if hens are raised in houses with less than 10,000
birds and 0 if otherwise;

  i ,USDAUSDA   i ,SizeNDSizeND   i ,SizeSmSizeSm   ij

where
OriginND
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if feed origin is not disclosed and 0 if otherwise;
OriginC
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if feed origin is China and 0 if otherwise;
OriginA
= dummy variable, taking the value of
1 if feed origin is Argentina and 0 if otherwise;
Price
= price per dozen;

Pr( y is  j ) 
(2)

exp(u ij )
J

 exp(u
j 1

ij

)

The model development so far has focused on a given
individual. The preference is expected to vary across
individuals. The heterogeneous preference across
individuals is captured in Equation (3), where the
individual preference parameters βi’s are assumed to
follow a multivariate normal distribution with mean 
and variance-covariance matrix Δ.
(3)

 i ~ Normal( , )

Model-based inference. The average preference
estimates (  ) are reported in Table 4. For the purpose
of parameter identification, we set preference for egg
feed origin in USA to zero. Relative preferences for
feed origin from China and Argentina are significantly
negative from zero at the 1% level. In another word, on
average, consumers prefer the eggs with feed from
USA more than from either China or Argentina. When
feed origin information is missing, its preference is not
significantly different that with feed origin in USA. A
closer look at the distribution of the heterogeneity for
this attribute (see Figure 1) reveals that the distribution
of βi,OriginND resembles the shape of the mixture of two
Normal distributions. About one fourth (26.9%) of
consumers belong to a segment that are skeptical and
have a negative view about the feed origin when it is
missing, manifested by the left portion of the curve
peaking on the negative side. The right part of the
distribution with a small peak on the positive side
indicates that a small proportion (17.7%) of consumers
have a positive view of the missing origin. The
preference of the majority of consumers (55.4%) for

2705

the eggs with missing information on feed origin is not
significant from zero. It is likely that these consumers
assume the missing feed origin information indicates
the feed comes from the USA. Another interesting
finding is that the preference magnitude for organic
feed (0.84) is not as big as consumers’ negative
association towards eggs if the chicken’s feed came
from China (-1.76). In another word, eggs with organic
feed from China are less favorable compared to eggs
with non-organic feed from the USA.
Figure 1: Study 1 – Distribution of Heterogeneity

Table 4: Model Estimation Results
OriginND
OriginC
OriginA
Price
Organic feed
Cage-free
USDA
SizeND
SizeSm

Study 1
-0.44 (0.20)
-1.76* (0.30)
-0.95* (0.19)
-0.68* (0.06)
0.84* (0.20)
1.53* (0.15)
0.00 (0.27)
0.71* (0.12)
0.48* (0.12)

Study 2
-0.74* (0.26)
-1.46* (0.28)
-0.60* (0.19)
-0.64* (0.07)
0.63* (0.19)
1.57* (0.14)
-0.33 (0.28)
0.51* (0.14)
0.33* (0.13)

Note: The table shows posterior means along with
posterior standard deviations in parentheses.
* Indicates significance at the 1% level.
Contrary to the findings from extant literature
that well-known certification logos of organic labeling
are favored by consumers (Janssen and Hamm 2012;
Kiesel and Villas-Boas 2007), the preference for
USDA certification is found to be zero for these
consumers when they choose organic eggs. The
general pattern of preference estimates for other
variables is as expected. Price negatively impacts the
utility. For bird size, the missing information on bird
size has a positive preference relative to bird size
bigger than 10,000 birds, so does the small bird size
(less than 10,000).

Market Simulation. To further assess the
impact of feed origin information disclosure, we
compared the market share of organic eggs when the
feed origin information is missing vs. disclosed.
Specifically, we want to understand if the sellers were
to voluntarily disclose the feed origin of their organic
eggs, what market share and price premium could be
claimed after the voluntary disclosure compared to the
original market situation when feed origin is missing.
We computed brand shares under a fairly
representative market scenario as shown in Table 5.
Egg A is non-organic, non-cage free and lowest priced
at $1.99/dozen. Egg B is non-organic, but cage-free. It
is priced at $2.99/dozen. Egg C is USDA organic,
cage-free and most expensively priced at $4.99/dozen.
In Scenario 1 (baseline scenario), the information on
feed origin is missing for Egg A, B and C. The market
shares for A, B and C are 21.14%, 49.46% and 29.40%
respectively. In Scenario 2, when the feed origin of egg
C is changed to USA, the market shares for A, B and C
are 18.18%, 42.54% and 39.27%. The share of organic
egg is increased by about 10% when the feed origin is
labeled as coming from the USA from when the feed
origin in unknown. The increase in egg C’s market
share mainly comes from the middle tiered egg (egg
B), which witnessed a loss of about 7% in share. The
price premium that egg C could charge is $0.65/dozen
if the feed from USA is labeled compared to the
baseline situation when the feed origin information is
missing. The price premium is calculated assuming
that the market share in Scenario 2 is not changed from
the baseline scenario. In another word, if the same
market share were to be maintained at the same level
as the baseline scenario, Egg C could claim a higher
price of $0.65/dozen when the feed origin information
for organic eggs is changed from missing to from the
USA. Finally, in Scenario 3, when the feed origin of
egg C is changed to China, the market shares for A, B
and C are 26.95%, 63.04% and 10.01%. While egg B
(share increased by 13.58% compared to baseline) is
the bigger beneficiary of the egg C’s market share
decline (decreased by 19.39% compared to baseline),
some egg C buyers even switched to egg A (share
increased by 5.81%). Egg C with feed imported from
China would have to discount by $1.94/dozen if the
feed origin information is labeled in order to maintain
the same market share. In addition, policy makers
would be interested to know the market impact of a
mandatory disclosure of feed origin. If under a
situation where all the feed origin is a mandated
disclosure, the price premium of USA feed over
Chinese feed is $2.59/dozen (difference between
Scenario 2 and Scenario 3).
Table 5: Study 1 Market Simulation
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Egg A
Price: $1.99/dozen
Non organic feed
Non cage-free
Non USDA
Size: not disclosed

Egg B
S cenario 1 (baseline)
Price: $2.99/dozen
Non organic feed
Cage-free
Non USDA
Size: not disclosed

Egg C
Price: $4.99/dozen
Organic feed
Cage-free
USDA
Size: not disclosed

Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing

Feed origin: Missing

M arket share: 21.14% M arket share: 49.46%
S cenario 2 (US A)

M arket share: 29.40%

Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing

Feed origin: US A

M arket share: 18.18% M arket share: 42.54% M arket share: 39.27%
S cenario 3 (China)
Feed origin: Missing Feed origin: Missing

Feed origin: China

M arket share: 26.95% M arket share: 63.04%

M arket share: 10.01%

In summary, Study 1 finds evidence that the
information on feed origin is an important factor in
people’s purchase decision of eggs, more so than
organic feed and USDA certification label. Without a
mandatory disclosure policy, a small price premium
($0.65/dozen) can be potentially claimed by labeling
the feed from USA. However, the preference of
missing information on feed origin is not significantly
different from the preference of feed from USA.
Sellers of the eggs with feed from non-USA countries
should be motivated to disguise the information on
feed origin. If the policy makers mandate the
disclosure of feed origin, the USA feed could claim a
much bigger price premium ($2.59/dozen) over the
least popular feed origin in the study.

3.2. Study 2
Study Design. Study 1 represents the current market
situation in which feed origin is not required to
disclose, but companies may choose to disclose it. The
findings from Study 1 show that eggs with feed from
USA have a competitive edge compared to eggs with
feed from China and Argentina. At the same time, not
labeling the feed origin from non-USA countries would
not hurt the sales of the corresponding eggs. In the
current market situation where the labeling of feed
origin is not mandated, the producers and retailers of
eggs with USA feed won’t benefit much from labeling
the feed origin. Consumers’ welfare will be
undermined if they do want eggs with feed from the
USA but end up buying eggs with missing feed origin
information. However, as we discussed earlier, a
mandatory disclosure could take a long time to become
a policy. Increasingly, consumers are becoming more
reliant on third party product information platforms to
find out more information about products. In Study 2,
we explore a way for the third party product
information platforms to more effectively signal the

unavailability of the missing information on feed
origin.
To make the results comparable with those of
Study 1, we again used egg as focal product category
in Study 2. The data was again collected using a
Qualtrics web-based survey and a nationwide online
sample. 130 respondents (a different sample from
Study 1) participated in Study 2. The attributes and
levels used in the conjoint exercises are the same with
those in Study 1. The only difference is that the
undisclosed feed origin is labeled literally as “Feed
origin is not disclosed” instead of missing, shown in
Table 6. It has been found that consumers tend to rely
on information that is more salient, and information
presentation can be used to highlight meaning that is
less salient on its own [34]. Displaying “Feed origin is
not disclosed” could raise the salience of this attribute
level and potentially help consumers distinguish the
feed that comes from USA vs. undisclosed feed origin.
Study 2 participants have similar demographic
background to Study 1 respondents too.
Table 6: An Example of the Conjoint Exercise in
Study 2
Egg A
Price:
$3.99/dozen
Organic feed
Hens are raised in
cages
No USDA
Organic
certification
Size: 10,000100,000 birds
Feed origin is
not disclosed

Egg B
Price:
$4.99/dozen
Organic feed
Hens are raised
cage free
USDA Organic
certification
Size: 100,000250,000 birds
Feed comes from
Argentina

Egg C
Price:
$2.99/dozen
Non organic feed
Hens are raised
cage free
No USDA
Organic
certification
Flock size is not
disclosed
Feed comes from
USA

Model-based inference. The average preference
estimates (  ) in Study 2 are reported next to Study 1
results in Table 4. The overall pattern of the preference
is similar to Study 1 except for the undisclosed feed
origin. The preference for undisclosed feed origin is
significantly negative from zero in Study 2, whereas it
is not significant when the information of feed origin is
missing in Study 1. Analysis on heterogeneity reveals
that 37.7% of respondents have a negative opinion of
the undisclosed feed origin, an increase of more than
ten percent from 26.9% in Study 1. The new
information disclosure method that specifies the
unavailable information on feed origin as “not
disclosed” rather than missing makes the feed origin
from USA much more appealing in comparison. It is
noteworthy that average consumers’ negative
association towards eggs if the chicken’s feed comes
from a “not disclosed” location (-0.74) overwhelms the
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preference magnitude for organic eggs (0.63). It
implies that all others equal, an average consumer
would prefer eggs with non-organic feed coming from
USA to eggs with organic feed coming from a “not
disclosed” location.
Market Simulation. Similar to Study 1, we
compare the market share of eggs when the feed origin
information is “not disclosed” vs. disclosed in order to
assess the impact of this new feed origin information
disclosure method. The market simulation is computed
under a fairly representative market scenario as shown
in Table 7. Egg A is non-organic, non-cage free and
lowest priced at $1.99/dozen. Egg B is non-organic,
but cage-free. It is priced at $2.99/dozen. Egg C is
USDA organic, cage-free and most expensively priced
at $4.99/dozen. In Scenario 1 (baseline scenario), the
information on feed origin is “not disclosed” for Egg
A, B and C. The market shares for A, B and C are
22.29%, 56.50% and 21.21% respectively. In Scenario
2, when the feed origin of the organic egg C is changed
to USA, the market shares for A, B and C are 18.09%,
45.85% and 36.06%. The share of the organic eggs is
increased by about 15% from scenario 1 to 2. The
increase in egg C’s market share mainly comes from
egg B, which witnesses a loss of about 11% in share.
The price premium that egg C could charge is
$1.16/dozen if the feed from USA is labeled compared
to “not disclosed” feed origin. Similar to Study 1, the
price premium is calculated assuming that the market
share in Scenario 2 is not changed from the baseline
scenario. The higher price premium that egg C with
USA feed could claim in comparison to that in Study 1
($1.16 vs. $0.65 per dozen) signifies the power of the
new information disclosure method. Finally, in
Scenario 3, when the feed origin of egg C is changed to
China, the market shares for A, B and C are 25.02%,
63.40% and 11.58%. Egg C with feed imported from
China would have to discount by $1.13/dozen if the
feed origin information is labeled.
Study 2 tests an information sharing method
for the third party product information platform to
effectively signal the unavailability of the missing
information on feed origin, when mandatory disclosure
is not in place. The goal is to find an inexpensive way
to reduce the harm caused by information asymmetry,
so that consumers could pay more attention to the
missing information on feed origin when they shop for
organic eggs. With the feed origin shown as “not
disclosed” instead of feed origin information being
omitted for those non-disclosures on feed origin, the
eggs with feed from USA are much more preferred by
consumers and hence could charge a much higher price
premium.
Table 7: Study 2 Market Simulation

Egg A

Egg B

Egg C

S cenario 1 (baseline)
Price: $1.99/dozen

Price: $2.99/dozen

Price: $4.99/dozen

Non organic feed

Non organic feed

Organic feed

Non cage-free

Cage-free

Cage-free

Non USDA

Non USDA

USDA

Size: not disclosed
Feed origin: Not
disclosed

Size: not disclosed
Feed origin: Not
disclosed

Size: not disclosed
Feed origin: Not
disclosed

M arket share: 22.29% M arket share: 56.50% M arket share: 21.21%
S cenario 2 (US A)
Feed origin: Not
disclosed

Feed origin: Not
disclosed

Feed origin: US A

M arket share: 18.09% M arket share: 45.85% M arket share: 36.06%
S cenario 3 (China)
Feed origin: Not
disclosed

Feed origin: Not
disclosed

Feed origin: China

M arket share: 25.02% M arket share: 63.40% M arket share: 11.58%

5. Discussion & Concluding Remarks
In summary, our study found that revealing feed origin
makes a difference in consumers’ choice of organic
eggs. Eggs with feed from US have a competitive
advantage over eggs with feed from China or
Argentina. However, we were also able to illustrate
that in a current market situation in which there is no
requirement to disclose feed origin, seller are more
often than not motivated to hide this information away
from consumers. When feed origin is omitted from the
label, eggs with non-US origin received similar
preference to eggs with US feed origin. Assumingly,
farmers in US are in general under more stringent legal
requirement and thus are assumed by consumers of
delivering higher quality of organic eggs. At the same
time, meeting higher level quality requirements might
also incur higher level of production cost. While not
adequately compensated by the market, there might be
little motivation for producers to pursue higher level of
quality, leading to market failure. At the same time,
consumers’ confidence and trust over organic
certification regulation might be eroded over the time
if they assumed of buying organic product with
consistent and high quality while end up getting
product with questionable quality.
Our study demonstrated that this problem can be
potentially corrected in two ways. The first approach is
to mandate the disclosure of feed origin, and the
second is to utilize a food traceability and disclosure
platform that heighten the salience of feed origin.
Government may require that firms producing goods
with credence or potemkin attributes to substantiate
their claims through mandatory labeling or disclosure
system. This approach, although effective, requires
major legislative actions, which may encounter
substantial resistance in the short term. The difficulties
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can be illustrated by the recent failure of passing a bill
that would have set labeling standards for genetically
modified foods based on arguments of protecting firms
and consumers from raising costs and other interests.
In US, food traceability systems that include feed
origin have been largely motivated by economic
incentives, rather than government regulation [35].
Although private sectors have developed enormous
capability to track the flow of food, government has
refrained from imposing traceability and disclosure
standards to private entities, under the assumption that
private will be motivated to disclose by benefits of
expanded sales of high-value products. This study,
however, proved that this assumption may not be
correct. The policy implications of a mandated
disclosure regulation may need to be revisited in light
of the empirical results. The second approach, what we
called “smart disclosure”, will reach similar desirable
results by establishing guidelines for third-party
platforms that raise the salience of missing information
on feed origin. This might be a more realistic and low
cost approach. Our study 2 illustrated that under this
approach, even when the sellers are under no
obligations to reveal feed origin, the stated omission of
information became a salient variable, and will be
treated with greater scrutiny from consumers.
Consumers’ informed decisions in turn will unleash the
power of the market, and provide incentives for sellers
to reveal validating cues, such as US feed origin, to
gain additional market share or claim higher premium.
As such, our study thus provide important directions
for smart disclosure policy initiatives.
In addition, it also has policy implications for
achieving sustainable consumption. In recent years,
sustainability became a raising issue and the
government roles in guiding consumption patterns
toward a more sustainable way are particularly
highlighted [25]. This paper introduced an approach
by which public and private sector can determine what
information is effective, and how information can be
consequential in reaching the policy goals for a more
sustainable pattern of consumption and production. By
focusing on the feed origin of organic eggs, we
discover that with an effective disclosure on feed
origin, the US farmers might be at a better position to
take advantage of the potential price premium over the
imported feed and be more motivated to convert into
organic farming, which delivers greater benefits to
environment and local economy.
This research made important contribution to
theory for sustainability policy approaches. In reent
years, an approach in the form of regulation through
information [36], informational regulation and
information governance [37] that emphasizes the role
of creation, processing, dissemination, and utilization

of information in environmental regulations has
emerged. It has been observed that regulations that
require private entities to disclose information lead to
desirable outcomes, such as with the emission of toxic
chemicals [38]. The use of information as a policy
instrument is seen as promising because it enlists the
market forces to create demand for firms to pursue
environmental interests as a results of their connection
to financial outcomes in the market. Information as a
governance instrument to address social and
environmental goals in future generations has received
increasing attention from the e-government research
(Estevez & Janowski, 2013). This study extends the
understanding of information regulation in the context
of consumer decision making in organic market. More
importantly, it also revealed the limitation of such
approach if it relies merely on voluntary disclosure. It
appears that a combined approach that join regulatory
mandates with information disclosure would be more
effective. This might be a direction for more studies in
the future.
Finally, this research has limitations. First, we
made feed origin as the focus of this paper as an
illustration of our approach. More systematic
evaluation of organic product attributes could be
conducted by using similar approach to provide
comprehensive guidelines for organic product
information disclosure. Second, we find feed origin an
important attribute in organic egg purchase and
consumers prefer US feed. Future study should focus
on the rationale and investigate the causes of the feed
origin preference to provide more diagnostic
suggestions for public and private sectors.
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